Not so sure that's a good idea. This would prevent users to programmatically compare hashes, and it would be hard to display one next to the other to facilitate comparison. Keep in mind that it is relatively easy to create a file that matches the first and/or last N chars of a hash. And who checks the center of the hash?
No, we have to have the browser compare the full hash and give a simple green light to the user. I don't have a proposition in terms of UX but it should be studied (should have been 15 years ago actually)
I was thinking the same thing, actually. I made a UX mockup this morning that I feel good about and was able to explain to my parents over brunch. I'll see if my friend wants to work on it.
I totally agree with you, except that asking users multiple times for their password will increase password fatigue. It may be argued that we could prefer the users to mindlessly click on Yes when a popup arises, instead of mindlessly inputting their password. Another option can be timers on the Yes button (like Firefox does), it blocks a few user interface hijacking attacks and gives the user an opportunity to think before they click.
Listening for these hotkeys is kind of pointless. The whole idea of pressing Ctrl + Alt + Del is that, while you can detect the keys being pressed, you cannot prevent Windows to display its interface on top of yours. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Secure_attention_key
That's actually a good mechanism that should be brought back to all modern OS. I wish Android had something similar (well, available physical input keys are limited, but you get the idea)
I would like to hope so, I haven't tried intercepting something like that(I just listen for certain keys), I do wonder if someone more experienced than me could listen for Ctrl and alt, then intercept the delivery, and display their own. (I would 'assume' the system gets first dibs on any keypress, but what if you listened for Ctrl and alt then used a sendkey to upkey the Ctrl and alt, and detect a del key press and then display a fake).
... Here we are, with an exploit that only affects people that enabled a remote management feature. If Intel had made this an optional addon that required a physical switch to enable, approximately the same number of people would be affected today, since it requires provisioning. It's not like every Intel system is silently waiting for an exploit payload.
Pretty much every large company running Intel hardware on professional desktops will have AMT on. It's pretty much SOP unless you really like site visits.
... And those companies would turn on the feature or get an equivalent third party system with the same attack surface. This doesn't seem to affect anyone that is against AMT.
You can't really easily opt-out of ME, which is the real problem. The fact that AMT has sprung a leak was only a matter of time but I'd rather not have the whole ME business.
I read about this a while ago. Apparently Intel's Management Technology which is built into like every Intel CPU now listens directly on the network interface so it can still send/receive data in case the OS is borked. It hooks in at ring 0. Like a rootkit the OS can't see.
It's common in the datacenter to come across motherboards with a switched eth0, with the BMC behind one leg and the user system behind another. You don't have to get that creative to get IPMI out of a machine when the OS is hosed -- to be honest, I think that is what you're actually thinking of, because "hook[ing] in on ring 0" is difficult to imagine working. You'd need driver awareness for when the management plane wants to transmit, at the least.
Not just SANs, pretty much their entire product line. iLO is a very common IPMI deployment at companies with HPe gear, which is a number of very large ones.
It's pretty much standard at large companies to never bother running the installer on the machine (if it even has one and isn't procured without an OS) they bought but instead to use a provisioning tool to re-image the machine before it first gets booted. Think of it as a DRAC card with some fancy tricks in a regular desktop (or laptop) and without occupying much space or a slot.
> only affects people that enabled a remote management feature.
The AMT can't be completely disabled, so people might not have to explicitly enable it to be vulnerable to AMT exploits.
> It's not like every Intel system is silently waiting for an exploit payload.
It's not like it's Intel makes it easy to navigate their CPU and motherboards feature set. Manufacturers are also known to do a bad job on their BIOS/EFI. And given that the computers most likely to be vulnerable are those most likely to be used by businesses and professionals, the damage potential is pretty staggering. But yeah, netbooks are probably safe.
It looks like this also affects systems where the feature is not enabled, but for "local" attackers. Does that mean exec as "www-data" or "nobody" accounts (what about VMs?). Making every little wordpress plugin vulnerability into a CPU-rooting hack?
Hey Michael, that's pretty amazing you have audited an encrypted and closed source binary from Intel to discover each Intel chip doesn't listen for an exploit payload. Would you mind sharing the keys you used to decrypt the firmware or the techniques you used to dissemble the binary back to the source code?
Most of them are just built into Windows now and are accessible through both the registry[1] and at runtime[2][3]. The latter requires recompiling with source code changes but the former can be applied to any application.
The EMET mitigations which are no longer supported have either been depreciated because of better ones (control flow guard) or are not terribly effective (EAF/EAF+, use of debug registers).
Do you? I noted that if I really wanted or needed the job that I'd put up with it. Wouldn't that apply to everyone?
Suppose you're happy where you are now but an opportunity comes by which sounds good so you start talking to them. They're super flakey. Wouldn't you just say "screw it"?
tl;dr: a CVSS 7.8 Windows vulnerability in the SMB service can allow an attacker to DoS any machine with the filesharing service exposed; the possibility of RCE seems to have been discarded; exploits are freely available online. This article complains that Microsoft's communication is lacking details and transparency in times of war
I think you mean a new distro which is mostly, but not entirely yet another a Ubuntu-derivative, which comes packaged with its own DE and related software.
And no, this new and perfect email-client will still not try to beat Outlook by managing both email and calendar at the same time. Go away!
Seriously... What are Linux Mint and ElementaryOS even thinking?
Realistically, about the same. Many of the problems with Windows are rooted in being developed by a huge corporation with as much budget and manpower as it has.
I get your point, but I meant that the open source community works because it can leverage on the work from each other. The achievements would be multiplied by the potential reach.
Algo looks good if you stick to IPSEC but WireGuard is years ahead, and much sounder. Considering WireGuard's promising start, imo it's OK if platform support isn't broad yet. You don't need Solaris support to start having your state-of-the art VPN between your servers and workstations.
