I would not want a quadrillion dollars in the first place, I would first try to reduce it to an amount that I can maintain relatively hassle-free and under-the-radar. But even for that perfect amount, I can't think of an age where I'd want to spent 10 years in prison, no matter how comfortable it is.
1. The idea behind UBI is that it is near-zero effort, the cost to operate UBI should be minimal. UBW cannot be low overhead I suppose.
2. What motivation do I have to do the work if I can’t get fired?
You have to work if you want to get paid. Otherwise you will get fired. The obligation of the state is to provide you with a guaranteed alternative job offer, not a guaranteed income.
It’s up to you if you take up the state’s offer or not.
The UBI removes the motivation to work and turns everything into volunteering. The result is a rise in the “reservation wage gap” - the amount the private sector has to pay to get people to work for them.
The reservation wage gap with a job guarantee is near zero - which is more economically efficient.
Additionally the job guarantee acts as a powerful spend side automatic stabiliser that is temporal and spatially efficient - which removes the need to manipulate the base interest rate allowing it to return to its natural rate of zero. This allows permanent cheaper mortgages and business loans.
One issue is that there's X% (debatable) of people who can't work for reasons that are complex or hard to explain. For many, even if they are physically able, you kinda don't want them to.
I mean, people who will create negative utility in a workplace or cost more in supervision expense than you get from them as output.
They create hazards for others by being drunk or on drugs on the job, or by harassing or bullying others, injuring themselves or others, causing personality conflicts or dramas due to trauma or unresolved mental health issues etc. I don't mean this as a value judgment, it's just like some people really aren't in a place in life where they can function well in work settings.
I'm not sure how you "guarantee" something that is dependent on complex situational decisions.
That confuses two points. Employees sell labour hours. At the basic living wage those hours are interchangeable between all people offering them. Even to the extent of age or infirmity. That’s what “unskilled labour” means.
The conversion of those hours into labour services is why the private sector is allowed to profit. If they want “better quality hours” then they have to bid up the price of those hours.
That should be market determined, rather than being administratively set as the gap between unemployment benefit and the minimum wage. You’ll be surprised how well the private sector can use hours once they see people doing the basics of turning up on time and doing something.
When we sentence offenders to “community service” we give them a job as rehabilitation, along with all the support mechanisms to straighten out lives. If we can do that for offenders, we can do that for everybody.
There would be overhead in asking people to do something (UBW) rather than simply offering money (UBI). It strikes me that the benefits of being able to limit unemployment directly rather than indirectly, of being able to direct community work that supports all of us, of more people being able to pay their bills instead of wondering how to do so, and of putting a floor under private sector wages and benefits is worth the overhead involved.
I'd note that UBI also requires administrative effort and expense.
> What motivation do I have to do the work if I can’t get fired?
As the other poster described, you've still got to work to get paid. It's a job, not just a paycheck. Another poster described the problems with hiring people who are not able to work. UBW shouldn't replace mental health facilities or jails... although I suspect that it'd reduce the number of people who need either of those facilities. I'd say that both of these types of problems are relatively small compared to the population and to the benefits that a UBW program would provide. Pilot UBW programs might help assess the validity of the above theories.
Everything you say is still the idea and I agree but where does the idea that progressive taxation would go away coming from? What does it have to do with UBI?
A UBI is a method of achieving the same effect as progressive taxation without the complexity and perverse incentives of tracking everyone's income and applying different marginal rates.
Suppose you have a tax system with progressive tax brackets and then a needs-based welfare system with benefits phase outs. It turns out, those two things (progressive rate structure and benefits phase outs) basically cancel each other out -- lower income people are supposed to pay lower marginal tax rates but if you're paying a 10% marginal tax rate and then have a 25% benefits phase out rate, that's the same as paying a 35% marginal tax rate. Worse, the benefits phase outs for different benefits often overlap, with the result that lower income people are often paying higher marginal tax rates than wealthy people, and there are some cases when their marginal rates even exceed 100% of marginal income.
So you have two unnecessarily complicated systems that mostly exist to cancel each other out, and to the extent that they don't they're doing something you don't actually want (excessively high marginal rates on poor people). It's better to just get rid of both -- no phase outs is the "universal" part of the UBI, and then you combine that with a uniform marginal tax rate for everyone.
You're basically getting rid of the progressive rate structure so you can lower the marginal tax rates on poor people to the ones being paid by rich people, and if that seems counterintuitive it's because the status quo is very stupid.
It turns out that a theoretically optimal non-linear taxation schedule features a UBI plus varying marginal tax rates (i.e. continuous tax brackets) that start out quite high (but sub-100%) in the UBI-clawback range (to manage the UBI break-even point while still offering a high subsidy to the very lowest earners) become very low for low-to-middle income earners and rise gradually for middle- and high-income earners. That's quite redistributive in intent, but the tax brackets themselves are neither "progressive" nor "regressive". Nevertheless, middle- and high-income earners do face moderately progressive rates.
They benefit from greatly lowered tax rates on their earned income (this is also a 'carrot' for the UBI net-receivers themselves, at least at the higher end), and high growth because you don't need to 'soak' higher-earning folks, who only pay moderately progressive rates. The alternative either has the lowest earning folks getting screwed out of receiving a meaningful subsidy (which is really bad) or pushes the break-even point way too high, which is not really what you want either and is the main criticism of UBI from a practical POV.
> They benefit from greatly lowered tax rates on their earned income
Lowered marginal tax rates. Raising the marginal rates on the lowest earners is raising the effective rates on the lower middle class. That they don't get anything is essentially the purpose of your proposal.
> and high growth because you don't need to 'soak' higher-earning folks, who only pay moderately progressive rates.
But did you actually have to do that? Having the lowest marginal rates be in the middle is pretty expensive because it's also lowering the effective rate on everyone above them, or at best is just balancing out having the highest rates at the bottom. It seems like you're trying to increase the amount of the UBI while making sure the extra money comes from the middle rather than the top. Having approximately the top half (50% of the population) pay so that the second quartile (25% of the population) can get ~half the UBI instead of none both doesn't seem like a bad thing and doesn't seem like it would cost them that much rate-wise because it's a 2:1 population ratio and they they have a higher per capita base to apply the rate to.
And having the highest rates at the bottom is pretty bad incentive-wise.
> or pushes the break-even point way too high
What's the problem with the break-even point being somewhere around the middle? The people only slightly below that aren't getting a large subsidy, they're just not getting literally zero.
Meanwhile the amount of "well I didn't make that much money because I had half of it paid to my kid" marginal rate arbitrage you're reintroducing is large.
> Raising the marginal rates on the lowest earners is raising the effective rates on the lower middle class.
Those are just clawback rates. The lower middle class don't need UBI in order to pay for the necessities of life, and most UBI proposals don't expect them to be net recipients, any more than they'd be net recipients of current welfare.
> it's also lowering the effective rate on everyone above them
That's balanced by the gradual progressivity of tax rates on upper-middle incomes.
> while making sure the extra money comes from the middle rather than the top
The low rates for the lower-middle class are actually ensuring the exact opposite of that claim. The upper incomes are the source for the bulk of income redistribution in the usual optimal system as it comes out of these analyses; they just don't face prohibitive rates.
> And having the highest rates at the bottom is pretty bad incentive-wise.
It's the opposite. The bottom clawback rates apply to a smaller part of the population, that can escape them simply by earning more than the UBI breakeven point. Meanwhile the high rates there help make the whole tax schedule sustainable. It may be a counterintuitive point but it's confirmed by rigorous, automated analysis.
> marginal rate arbitrage you're reintroducing is large
The most likely response is not necessarily arbitrage, it might just be earning enough that you start paying low marginal rates after the UBI is clawed back.
> The bottom clawback rates apply to a smaller part of the population, that can escape them simply by earning more than the UBI breakeven point.
That's not true. One of the issues any serious UBI proposal needs to face are the increasing demands of the labor market. A couple of generations ago, there were still plenty of opportunities for people who had little to offer beyond a pair of hands and some work ethic. Today not so much.
The bottom end of the labor market consists of a nontrivial number of people who are not productive enough to earn a living wage. But there are still societal benefits from having them work for living, instead of being passive welfare recipients or turning to crime. To make that happen, even a low wage should increase the net income significantly above UBI.
> The lower middle class don't need UBI in order to pay for the necessities of life, and most UBI proposals don't expect them to be net recipients, any more than they'd be net recipients of current welfare.
The premise of them receiving it isn't so they can buy corn, it's so they can save up a down payment on a house or have enough savings that if their car breaks down they're not completely screwed. They're supposed to get the money.
> That's balanced by the gradual progressivity of tax rates on upper-middle incomes.
That's not balancing it, it's further exacerbating it. You then have the upper middle class paying less than the full marginal rate, along with everyone above them for that part of their income range.
> The low rates for the lower-middle class are actually ensuring the exact opposite of that claim.
I feel like this is still confusing effective rates with marginal rates.
Suppose you have a 50% marginal rate up to $30,000 in income and then a 5% marginal rate up to $60,000. Alice makes $32,000/year. In this system her effective tax rate is ~47%. By contrast, Bob makes $60,000 and has an effective tax rate of 27.5%. Moreover, between the two of them they have $92k in total income of which the government gets $31600, ~34%. Why would we want Alice to have to pay ~47% instead of ~34% so that Bob, who makes almost twice as much, can pay 27.5% instead of ~34%?
Adding the UBI would lower both effective rates and result in a progressive rate curve, but why would we want to add "progressive" rates that make the system less progressive?
> The upper incomes are the source for the bulk of income redistribution in the usual optimal system as it comes out of these analyses; they just don't face prohibitive rates.
But why would you need prohibitive rates at all?
US GDP is ~$31T with a population of ~340M. To give a $12,000 UBI to every single person would be ~$4T, i.e. 12.9% of GDP, implying that's the uniform marginal tax rate you would need to collect the money. That's assuming the tax is applied uniformly (and applies to corporations as well as individuals etc.), and maybe you want to exempt non-profits from the tax or something, but as a ballpark estimate that's the number and it's not crazy high. Especially when it's a universal transfer payment and the majority of people are just getting most or all of it back immediately.
> The bottom clawback rates apply to a smaller part of the population, that can escape them simply by earning more than the UBI breakeven point.
That's not how that works. If you had a 50% marginal rate up to $30,000 and you're deciding whether to take a $32,000 job or not work, you're only getting $16,900 to put in your pocket from taking that job. Being "out of the clawback range" doesn't stop the majority of the pay from still being in it. And, of course, there are jobs that don't even pay that much, or some people might want to work part time and you're essentially screwing them for not making enough money.
> Meanwhile the high rates there help make the whole tax schedule sustainable. It may be a counterintuitive point but it's confirmed by rigorous, automated analysis.
Why do we need automated analysis to do arithmetic? You can avoid a huge increase in the rate on lower income people with a much smaller increase in a universal rate because the former only applies to a small proportion of total income and the latter applies to all of it.
> The most likely response is not necessarily arbitrage, it might just be earning enough that you start paying low marginal rates after the UBI is clawed back.
As soon as you have non-uniform marginal rates, arbitrage is going to happen. We don't have to speculate here because we currently have non-uniform marginal rates and it's extremely common. Family members in a lower tax bracket get added to the payroll to soak up taxable income at the lower rate.
We're talking about the lower middle class, they can sustain themselves by working, essentially by definition. They can get the money (compared to the status quo) - by working, because they'll be paying negligible overall rates on their own earnings as soon as the UBI is fully clawed back. Redistribution (UBI) is costly (being funded by high rates on the higher incomes, that deter them from earning more), so in most practical proposals it is largely limited to those who really are unable (or perhaps unwilling, but in a near-optimal system such 'unwillingness' is most often explained by practical inability) to earn enough for a tolerable life. Giving any part of the middle class a net-UBI only to claw it back with high rates (as it must be at some point in the tax schedule) wouldn't leave them any better off in practice and it would set up pathological anti-work incentives. It's a pretty clear non-starter.
> You then have the upper middle class paying less than the full marginal rate
If you're talking about effective rates being less than marginal rates, that's just inherent to any progressive taxation. There is in fact a strange theoretical result that the very top earner should ultimately be facing a zero marginal rate on their very last dollar of income since any non-zero rate on that "top" level is pure overhead, but of course that's a bit of a curiosity and hard to apply in practice, except maybe as a broad caution against the common idea of levying punitive rates on the very highest incomes. Progressive taxation at the high end is still the practical optimum.
> I feel like this is still confusing effective rates with marginal rates.
I feel like you're disregarding the fact that the high-rates at the bottom are purely UBI-clawback rates; in fact, $30,000 per year seems quite infeasible as a UBI range, so ISTM that you're inadvertently getting the wrong idea entirely about what the system might imply!
> We're talking about the lower middle class, they can sustain themselves by working, essentially by definition.
Then why does the existing system provide all manner of healthcare subsidies, student loan subsidies, etc. with phase outs extending well into that income range? The ACA subsidy for a family of four isn't fully phased out until $132k.
> Redistribution (UBI) is costly (being funded by high rates on the higher incomes, that deter them from earning more)
Aggressive claw backs are more costly because they require much higher marginal rates on lower income people and it's high marginal rates that provide the disincentive to work. Even before considering the argument that people being paid low hourly rates are easier to deter to begin with, because paying someone else to do something for you in order to free up time to work for money instead of doing it yourself is more costly to someone who gets a lower hourly wage.
> Giving any part of the middle class a net-UBI only to claw it back with high rates (as it must be at some point in the tax schedule) wouldn't leave them any better off in practice and it would set up pathological anti-work incentives.
Have you done the math on this one? The bottom 50% of people have <15% of total personal income. You get less money by increasing their pre-UBI effective rate by 50% than by increasing the universal effective rate by 7.5%, while providing them with a massive disincentive to work.
> If you're talking about effective rates being less than marginal rates, that's just inherent to any progressive taxation.
No, we need to distinguish two things here. One is the incremental effective rate for taking a job, i.e. if the employer pays $X to employ you, what total percent of X goes to the government? This is the thing that matters when choosing whether to take the job (incentive to work). You want this number to be uniform because any decrease in one place requires an increase for someone else and you lose jobs whenever you cause the rate to exceed the surplus derived from the job, so combinations of high and low rates are less efficient than uniformly medium ones. You especially don't want it to be higher for lower income people, because then the increase on them is disproportionately large.
The other is the effective rate net of unconditional benefits. When you get benefit (i.e. UBI) regardless of whether you take the job then that's included here but not there.
You get the same effect as a progressive rate structure in the second sense with a flat rate plus a UBI, because everyone pays the same marginal rate and therefore the same effective rate in the first sense, but someone who makes $54,000, pays a third of it in tax but receives a $12,000 UBI is on net paying $4000, i.e. 7.5% rather than 33% of $54k, whereas someone who makes a billion dollars is still paying a third and receiving the UBI, but $12,000 is a trivial percentage of a billion so their effective rate is still ~33%.
> There is in fact a strange theoretical result that the very top earner should ultimately be facing a zero marginal rate on their very last dollar of income since any non-zero rate on that "top" level is pure overhead
This theory assumes that the primary decision here is whether to work an additional hour, but the primary decision is actually which job to take, if any. You might make three times as much if you become a doctor, but then you give up 8 years of earnings to go to school and exit that with six figures in student debt. If you're deciding when to retire, or whether to enter the workforce but then have to pay much of your earnings in childcare and commuting expenses, you're either keeping/taking the job or you're not. The "incremental" rate when making the decision applies to the majority of or entirety of the compensation, not just the last dollar.
And notice that you can simultaneously screw this up on both ends. If you put oppressively high rates at the low end, even if that only lowers the high end rates by a minor amount, it just became relatively a lot more attractive to make three times as much money. Then you get elite overproduction and cost disease because you're screwing the janitors and service workers so hard on the tax rate. Some of them fall out of the workforce, others turn to diploma mills and employers have trouble hiring in that income range for necessary jobs and then have to raise prices on everyone. It's the same terrible thing the existing system does and what we should be trying to prevent.
> I feel like you're disregarding the fact that the high-rates at the bottom are purely UBI-clawback rates
There aren't supposed to be clawback rates. That's the entire point -- to get rid of the punitively high work-disincentivizing marginal rates for lower income people present in the existing system.
> in fact, $30,000 per year seems quite infeasible as a UBI range
That number is lower than the existing income level where people pay zero/negative federal income taxes net of benefits.
You should repeat that claim with concrete numbers.
What is the effective marginal tax rate in the UBI-clawback range, including any housing / healthcare / childcare / whatever benefits lost due to income? And what is the minimum hourly net income that would encourage someone with guaranteed basic income to take a job instead of staying at home? With those two numbers, you can calculate an effective minimum wage, below which it would be practically impossible to hire anyone.
> And what is the minimum hourly net income that would encourage someone with guaranteed basic income to take a job instead of staying at home? With those two numbers, you can calculate an effective minimum wage, below which it would be practically impossible to hire anyone.
The answer to the first question varies from person to person, and from job to job since some of them are less desirable to do independent of what they pay, which means the threshold in the second question doesn't actually exist. There may be 100 people willing to work a specific job for $X/year but not 1000 people, etc.
Mathematically equivalent does not mean human psychologically equivalent. e.g., people prefer a discount, even if the actual final numbers are the same. The framing matters
UBI basically is an equalizer, instead of a standard deduction and graduated taxation, you get $N off the top and pay X% of whatever you earn. The progression comes in the money you get since it comes out of taxes from everyone, theoretically it is wealth redistribution especially if it becomes a significant part of most people’s income.
Nah - I've also spent decades trying to become the best software developer I can and now it is giving me enormous power. What used to take me 5 days is now taking me a day, and my output is now higher quality. I now finish things properly with the docs, and the nooks and crannies before moving on.
What used to take incompetent developers 5 days - it is still taking them 5 days.
Actually most watch collectors do not wear their most expensive watches, they have daily or travel watches to wear that carry less risk.
Also, watches are status symbols to a really narrow niche. Vast majority of people cannot name a non-Rolex expensive watch and would assume Seiko (and maybe Tissot) are the best watches after Rolex, followed by Swatch (and maybe Timex).
I don't think either of these points change the fact that if you bought a Rolex (or IWC or whatever) that someone slipped you out the side door of the factory, identical in every way except missing the logos, for a substantial discount, it would not be nearly as valuable or prestigious in your collection as a genuine one that other collectors would want. How much would a serious collector splash out on an unofficial - and very unspecial - version of a 100k watch?
I'd do that in a heartbeat for a MacBook, though. Same as with any other consumer good.
Apple is competing in the "premium fit and finish" product space, not the "luxury good" space, so the brand is significantly less of a factor of the value for their devices than it is for Rolex, IWC, etc.
And despite the essay linked here—which seems like a lot of words spilled on a fairly mundane history lesson—I don't think "luxury goods are driven by name value" is anything new. Goes back to the wealthy being patrons of the arts for hundreds, thousands of years... They wanted their name associated with those works, and they wanted those works to be famous. Status all the way down. "When telling the time became ubiquitous, the luxury goods part of the watch market became an increasingly large part of it" is uninteresting.
There are of course people who buy Rolexes or whatever for the brand. There are probably more people who buy Mac Books for the logo.
But most people are rational. Most people would pay that much money for a watch only if it does not impact their finances in a meaningful way, but within that, they would want to buy the highest quality they can. And for some people that means an IWC, Omega, Longines, or whatever. If they could buy the same quality from a less known brand, they would. Lots of people buy Grand Seikos at Rolex prices. I buy normal Seikos at $300. We all pay for the quality we can afford.
Brand is important because it is an insurance that you are not being scammed. Besides that, it is not the main factor let alone “era defining” as the article is trying to make it out.
not to tangent off from your point too much but I think in reality one might in fact pay more for a logoless macbook just because it would in itself be a pretty unique and cool artefact, and a good story as to how you acquired it!
Casio is the best watch brand in the world. This is measurable - most features, battery life, versatility, utility, and durability for the lowest possible price. It's an objective truth. Given this, other watch brands have had to differentiate, and since they cannot compete on pure functionality alone, they offer luxury or, as pg points out, brand identity as a differentiatior.
I would argue Garmins are better value for the money for fitness features but I agree. I excluded Casio because they build “brand era” watches as well as extremely cheap watches, not to mention all the other things they do. So I’m not sure where Casio is to average consumer when it comes to watches.
You are pointing to an outlier that is not expensive due to its beauty but historical significance. Typical expensive watches look normal and beautiful:
Of course, they look like normal watches, that’s the point. However, if you paid for, you would get an extremely polished watch, rares/high-quality materials, hand-checked for every imperfection etc. as opposed to an almost the same looking watch for a brand, say Orient, which you would be able to find minor imperfections even as a non-enthusiast.
I dunno. Having looked at cheaper watches, I don't see imperfections. I'll grant that over time they'll show up (quicker wear and tear).
Here's the thing: Ever since I was a kid, the following features were basic:
1. Tells time
2. Tells date
3. Stopwatch
4. Alarm
5. Chrono (yes, I used that a lot for years).
All this for $50 or less.
I'm assuming the >$100 watches have all this? If not, IMO, the watch is simply failing at the very basics. It shouldn't even be called a watch.
Then Tier 2:
- Timer
- Multiple alarms
- World time
I pay extra for these (and use all of them).
The next tier (Tier 3):
- No batteries and/or solar. Definitely no manual winding.
The next tier:
- Stuff like GPS, sunrise/sunset, etc.
Personally, only after Tier 3 would I consider paying extra for all the things you mentioned. But paying $300+ for a watch without a timer or world time? You've been scammed.
How much have you paid for a pen? Montblanc ball point pens can exceed $1000. Apply everything you said to a (ballpoint) pen - one that most likely will write poorer than a good $50 fountain pen - and you'll see how people view what you are saying.
These particular watches are not my taste as well (I do not find them ugly though) but these are some of the most popular examples watch community find very pretty.
Citron is obviously a weird watch but you can always find weird expensive examples of anything. Most expensive watches look normal and they look really beautiful thanks to the attention that goes into building them.
Yes, what I find beautiful is the craftsmanship, dedication, and the singular, almost monastic focus required to become a master in some human pursuit, whether its software, sushi, or making watches. I find dedication and sacrifice deeply moving and eternally beautiful.
I agree. Following his x account and posts, intellectuality in PG’s content has gone massively downhill (starting from slightly earlier than his recent rants about ‘wokeness’).
Once one of my favourite writers is really hard to read now.
It feels to me like he is so overconfident now that he thinks he gets it in any topic, even on the ones he has very little understanding of.
I’d wish for a more pointed rebuttal than merely a post complaining that the writer now sucks on here. It seems substantial to a degree of a post to me at least even if not whole in its conclusions.
This particular article, I would say compherensive, but lacking substance.
The very promise of this article, that people primarily paying for brand name is simply wrong and it does not take too much time to spend in watch circles to know this.
What people pay is not performance/features/value, obviously. But the prime factor is also not the brand name. With the exception of Rolex, practically nobody knows if your watch costed $100 or $100,000.
What people pay for is artistry, reliability, and level-of-polish. These all have a cost that justify the price of the watch. Nobody pays $10,000 for a watch that could be produced for $100 just because of its brand name.
That may be your anecdote but CTO at a 30-50 person scale up would typically have much more management/accounting/signature/high-stake conversation/... experience than a senior developer at google.
Yes. Which is why it's important to put scope on your resume.
I can't know you ran a 30 person scale up unless you tell me. It doesn't have to be in those words exactly, usually it's tied to ARR or rounds raised or something you can easily talk about that translates across companies.
I've seen resumes with titles like "Lead Engineer" who under that title put something like "Hired 45+ people to run <huge systems> at <company you've heard of>". That person has more scope than the 30-people CTO in your example :)
PS: 30 people isn't even that many for a whole company. That's a Series A startup with early signs of product-market-fit. It's common to see a ratio of 10 employees for every 1 engineer in the company.
It gives me more insight than a blank resume with just job titles.
The rest we can hash out in interviews, reference checks, and reaching out to mutual network connections at higher levels. Nobody gets hired just off their resume.
That is to say: All line items are verifiable if we care enough. Tech is small :)
Generalist means something very different for big orgs.
At FANG size companies have people to setup 401k and health insurance, tiny startups need 1 of 3 people to figure that out even if it just means finding a company to outsource such things it still needs to happen. Payroll doesn’t need to be a complex system but taxes must be paid etc.
I would say I look at it from a different angle, big companies can afford specialists. Startups cannot afford specialized employee for database administration or setting up 401k.
But big companies would definitely love to have to pay a single salary for someone who does 401k and when this job is done administrates databases then in between reviews tweets searching for mentions of the company. Exaggerated example but I hope clear.
That already shows up with everything getting „Ops” obviously DevOps but I already have seen DataOps, SalesOps and MarketingOps.
That shows an ability to figure out what needs to be done and do it, regardless of whether it fits the formal job description. That can be an invaluable skill in an organization of any size.
It's the story of foxes and hedgehogs... Both have a time and place. Sometimes you need people who can aggressively put out fires, and sometimes you need people with deep focus for the long haul, who aren't overly distracted by the heat.
It’s a valuable attitude, but not a particularly valuable skill.
Expertise gains value when it can’t be subdivided. A doctor needs to know a who lot of related skills to be a heart surgeon, it doesn’t work to split it into two less demanding roles. However two generalists can sub divide the workload of a generalist with a lot more experience because experienced generalists aren’t particularly skilled at anything.
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