I’m not sure it’s the file system per se, I believe the main reason is the security model.
NT kernel has rather sophisticated security. The securable objects have security descriptors with many access control entries and auditing rules, which inherit over file system and other hierarchies according to some simple rules e.g. allow+deny=deny. Trustees are members of multiple security groups, and security groups can include other security groups so it’s not just a list, it’s a graph.
This makes access checks in NT relatively expensive. The kernel needs to perform access check every time a process creates or opens a file, that’s why CreateFile API function is relatively slow.
I've been trying to use auditing rules for a usage that seems completely in scope and obvious to prioritize from a security point of view (tracing access to EFS files and/or the keys allowing the access) and my conclusion was that you basically can't, the doc is garbage, the implementation is probably ad-hoc with lots of holes, and MS probably hasn't prioritised the maintenance of this feature since several decades (too busy adding ads in the start menu I guess)
The NT security descriptors are also so complex they are probably a little useless in practice too, because it's too hard to use correctly. On top of that the associated Win32 API is also too hard to use correctly to the point that I found an important bug in the usage model described in MSDN, meaning that the doc writer did not know how the function actually work (in tons of cases you probably don't hit this case, but if you start digging in all internal and external users, who knows what you could find...)
NT was full of good ideas but the execution is often quite poor.
From an NTFS auditing perspective, there’s no difference between auditing a non-EFS file or EFS file. Knowing that file auditing works just fine having done it many times, what makes you say it doesn’t work?
I’m not sure it’s the file system per se, I believe the main reason is the security model.
NT kernel has rather sophisticated security. The securable objects have security descriptors with many access control entries and auditing rules, which inherit over file system and other hierarchies according to some simple rules e.g. allow+deny=deny. Trustees are members of multiple security groups, and security groups can include other security groups so it’s not just a list, it’s a graph.
This makes access checks in NT relatively expensive. The kernel needs to perform access check every time a process creates or opens a file, that’s why CreateFile API function is relatively slow.