OpenTimestamps alone can not currently prove anything because TLS session keys are symmetric. The client can forge anything and attest to it falsely. Unless you 100% trust the archiver (in which case you can trust their timestamps), you need TLSNotary or another reputable third party in the loop as a bare minimum.
But more critically: currently the legal standard for evidence is... screenshots. We have a lot of educating work to do before the public understands the value of attestation and signing.
> OpenTimestamps alone can not currently prove anything because TLS session keys are symmetric.
Timestamps can prove that the data existed prior to there being a known reason to modify it. While that's not as good as direct signing, that's often still enough to be very useful. The statement that OTS "can not currently prove anything" is incorrect.
A really good example of this is the Hunter Biden email verification. I used OpenTimestamps to prove that the DKIM key that signed the email was in fact used by Google at the time, by providing a Google-signed email that had been timestamped years ago: https://github.com/robertdavidgraham/hunter-dkim/tree/main/o...
That's convincing evidence, because it's highly implausible that I would have been working to fake Hunter's emails years before they even came up as an election issue.
Ok, fair point, they prove that content existed at some point in time, which is useful sometimes. But I don't want people to over-rely on that as "good enough", we can do much better, it's too low a bar for a whole ecosystem of archiving to rely on when we now have a viable solution to fix it (TLSNotary or others).
But more critically: currently the legal standard for evidence is... screenshots. We have a lot of educating work to do before the public understands the value of attestation and signing.