I'm surprised more companies don't do this, because it seems to me that the impact is clear: Like ambulance chasing, patent trolling relies on the simple principle that it's much, much cheaper to settle than to go to court -- for both sides. It's huge that they won, but they didn't need to. By sending the message that they will always go to court, my guess is they'll stop being sued.
On the other hand, the trolls know this, and may react by targeting companies that do this to demonstrate that it's not an effective strategy.
It's basic game theory. A single company standing up to the trolls is unlikely to make any difference (or at least looks unlikely in the absence of an example like Newegg), and may incur costs far greater than if they simply folded. If everybody stood up to the trolls together, then everybody would be better off, but the better strategy for the individuals is to fold. Prisoners' Dilemma writ large.
I continue to wonder why more companies being threatened by patent trolls don't band together to share legal expenses of a defense. Is there something in the legal rules and procedures that prevents a shared defense?
Yes, except that what we're starting to see is once a company settles with one troll, others hear they're an easy mark and show up with more demands. So even for a single company, settling is starting to become a bad strategy. As soon as you settle with one, that's that much less money you have to fight the next one with... and there will be a next one.
On the other hand, the trolls know this, and may react by targeting companies that do this to demonstrate that it's not an effective strategy.