Not in US law as far as I know, though there was a brief moment where that seems to have been the case in English law (between the Criminal Law Act of 1977 -- or at least, its application in DPP v. Nock, 1978 -- and the amendment to that act in the Criminal Attempts Act of 1981.)
An agreement between two or more people to commit an act which would be unlawful if the agreed-to end was realized and any one of those people taking even one concrete step toward putting the agreement into effect makes a conspiracy. (Except under the separate US federal narcotics conspiracy law, where, IIRC, the concrete act is not required.)
The question I guess is how you can take a concrete step, an actus reus, towards putting an agreement in to effect wherein the target of the action is entirely fictitious.
>an act which would be unlawful if the agreed-to end was realized //
If the person on whom the hit is called is fictional the agreed to end can't be realised. Even if it were in some way able to be realised [you pretend the person exists or don't know until the end of the act] the action itself wouldn't be unlawful except in and of itself. For example if you blew up a bridge to kill a person, but the person was made-up all along then you'd still be guilty of criminal damage and potentially of injury to bystanders and such but you wouldn't be guilty of murder. Not even attempted murder [IMV] as there was no person you tried to murder, you tried to murder an idea of a person.
Like I said in another post I see the moral deficiencies [evidenced by the mens rea (guilty mind)] in a person willing to be involved in such a conspiracy but it still appears to me to lack an actus reus which AFAICT is a cornerstone of criminal law based on the English tradition.
Your postscript on USA federal narcotics law is interesting - doesn't this mean that if you plan something with no intent that you'd be considered guilty. Would Vince Gilligan not then be guilty of drug crimes as he has planned many illegal activities they just apparently all lacked corresponding actions.
> If the person on whom the hit is called is fictional the agreed to end can't be realised.
Yes, that's the impossibility issue, which, as I've noted, is not generally in US law (and similar, but for a 3-4 year window ending in 1981, English law) relevant to whether the crime of conspiracy has been committed. The fact that it can't be realized is irrelevant to whether it would be a crime if it was realized.
> it still appears to me to lack an actus reus which AFAICT is a cornerstone of criminal law based on the English tradition.
The actus reus in conspiracy (both under the common law and the generally applicable modern English and American statutory provisions) is comprised of two things: an agreement among multiple people, and a concrete action directed toward putting the agreement into effect. Those are both acts, not mental states.
> Your postscript on USA federal narcotics law is interesting - doesn't this mean that if you plan something with no intent that you'd be considered guilty.
No, removing one of the required acts doesn't change the mens rea requirements, nor does it change the other required act; one person planning is not conspiracy (even under the federal narcotics provision that remove the second element.) Two or more people agreeing to some end whose realization would be another crime is the element that is required.
